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IMPACT OF ONLINE RENTING ON SOFTWARE PIRACY
Zeng X. H. (zengxiao@comp.nus.edu.sg),
Lee, T. S. Y. (tlee@comp.nus.edu.sg), and
Teo H. H. (teohh@comp.nus.edu.sg).

ABSTRACT
Online rental of software is emerging as a new way of dissemination for several major software firms.
Compared to outright selling, the renting scheme delivers the software as a service instead of a
physical good. Hence, users cannot privately make copies for resale in the market. We investigate the
impact of the renting mechanism on software piracy and pricing in a two-period model whereby a
piracy market is present in the second period. We develop and compare models with or without
renting. Our analysis shows that renting reduces social welfare but helps to increase a vendor’s profit
under certain conditions. We also assess the difference in outcomes in the presence of network effect.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Online rental of software is increasingly being practiced by some major software companies. For
instance, since 1996, Microsoft has launched the electronic distribution framework, which allows the
consumers to pay a monthly fee for accessing the software over Internet. Recently, Microsoft even
rented its office suite online, allowing people to use Microsoft Word, Excel and PowerPoint on a lease
agreement. Another example is the application service provider model (ASP), which provides access
to enterprise applications via the network (see, Delaney 1999). Several technologies such as Citrix and
Internet2, are emerging to enable remote delivery of software to end users in a scalable and reliable
fashion.
A distinguishing feature about the online rental mechanism is that the software is installed on vendors’
servers instead of end-users’ desktop. Vendors can use monitoring software to ensure no ‘leakage’
outside of the lease agreement. Compared to outright selling, vendors could alleviate the problem of
end-user piracy (private copying) through this mechanism. Piracy has been a perennial problem since
the advent of the software industry. Particularly, the emergence of Internet makes private copying
even easier and cheaper. Software that are pirated include personal software to business application
packages. Business Software Alliance reported $12 billion losses globally from piracy (BSA 1999).
Moreover, infringement of intellectual property discourages the production of creative works.
Governments of many countries have enacted compensatory laws to protect publishers and authors.
For example, in the United States, software piracy is punishable by statutory damages of up to
$100,000 for each work infringed and may result in a felony conviction.
We are interested in the impact of online renting on software piracy. In this paper, we treat software as
a durable product that lasts for two periods, and consider private copying in the second period only. A
two-period model has been previously used in studying traditional durable goods such as automobile
and household appliances (Bulow 1982, Purohit 1999). We compare the vendor’s pricing strategy and
profit with or without renting option, and analyze the consequences for social welfare under each
option. We also took into account the roles of government policy and network effect.

1320
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland

— First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —

Impact of Online Renting on Software Piracy

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Economics of copying has attracted enormous attention from academics. Research on copying has
focused mainly on its effects on producer’s strategies and social welfare, and sometimes under
conditions of network effect. The research stream on producers’ sales and profit identified two main
effects (Varian 2000). First, piracy will directly reduce demand of legitimate products. Second,
originals are more valuable when copying is possible. Most argued that the relative cost of producing
originals and copies is a key determinant in the change of profit. Particularly, profit will decrease
when private copying is costly (e.g., Liebowitz 1985). These results were obtained under the
assumption that the producer can price discriminate to capture the values of the copies made from each
original. In response to piracy, producers could re-examine their decision on production quality level
(Waldman 1984), extent of protection (Conner 1991), and optimal pricing (Fernando 1988).
The second research stream focused on social welfare and optimal government policy. Generally, this
impact is complex. Producers are believed to under-produce in the presence of copying. Improving
copyright protection might encourage producers to raise production but might induce greater social
welfare loss due to underutilization (Waldman 1984). Besen et al. (1989) summarized the impact on
producer and consumer welfare under different assumptions: (1) the extent to which the producer can
appropriate the consumer surplus; and (2) the substitutability of copies compared to the original.
The third research stream examined impact on producers’ strategies and social welfare when network
effect is present. With network effect, the value of the product increases with the number of users.
Software products tend to exhibit positive network effect. More users might help producers improve
the product through greater feedback. Common use might also help enhance management techniques
through standardization and foster higher product visibility. Copying might encourage legitimate sales
when network effect is strong (Conner 1991) or diffusion of copying is faster (Muller 1995). A
producer might deliberately facilitate copying to expand the installed base when there is competition
(e.g., Shy 1999).
The recent emergence of online rental of software has also attracted some academic attention.
Choudhary et al. (1998) discussed the benefits of renting in the presence of network externality.
Gurnani et al. (2001) studied the actual usage behavior of consumers, and concluded that renting could
expand the market size by tailoring the product to the needs of a particular client. However, most of
the literature on online rental of software seems to neglect the existence of a piracy market.
Additionally, little attention is being paid to understanding the link between private copying and the
distribution mechanism.
This paper seeks to bridge the gap between the copying and the online rental literature by examining
the effects of renting on software piracy. Specifically, we explore the following research questions: (i)
Does renting help counter software piracy, and under what conditions? (ii) What is the optimal pricing
strategy for the vendor when both selling and renting are used? (iii) How does renting affect social
welfare? (iv) How do the outcomes change when network effect is present?

3. THE MODEL
We consider a software product market under a monopolist software vendor. It is a two period model.
In the first period, the producer both sells and rents, and rental only lasts for one period. In the second
period, producer sells and faces a copying market. We assume there is Bertrand competition in the
piracy market, which drives the price to marginal cost. Following this typical assumption on
information goods, marginal costs are zero in our model. (see Bakos et al.1998)
Following the market segmentation used in some previous studies (Conner 1991), we assume that
there is a continuum of consumers indexed by the reservation price h  [0,1] . Depending on the prices,
consumers make the optimal decisions according to their preference. In the first period, consumer
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decides whether to buy or rent or just stay out of the market. Consumers who buy in the first period do
not need to do anything in the second period, while those who rent or stay out of the market would
choose to buy the legal product, or to buy pirated copy or do nothing at all. If consumers choose to buy
and use pirated copies, they may be caught and penalized later.
We define : b1 to be the software products sold to the consumers in the first period, : r to be the
products leased, : b 2 to be the legal product sold in the second period, and : c to be the pirated copies.
Let pb1 , p r , p b 2 be the price for : b1 , : r , : b 2 , respectively. Note that the price for : c is zero. Let
( x1 , x 2 ) be a consumer’s choice, where x1  {b, r ,0} represents three choices in the first period –
buying, renting, doing nothing, respectively; and x 2  {b, r ,0} represents three choices in period two –
buying : b 2 , buying : c , doing nothing, respectively.
To understand the software vendor’s incentives to provide rental option to control software piracy, we
compare two cases for the vendor: rental option versus no rental option. For each case, we first
examine the consumer’s choice and the corresponding surplus functions followed by deriving the
demand function and the monopolist’s profit.

3.1. WITHOUT RENTAL OPTION
In this case, the software provider only sells : b1 in the first period. Consumer decides whether to buy
it or not. Non-buying consumers might buy : b 2 or : c or do nothing in the second period. Space for
consumer’s choices is represented by {(b, 0) (0, b) (0, c) (0, 0)}.
We examine the consumer surplus function for each group: (1) For consumer who chooses (b, 0), his
surplus is V( b , 0 ) (1  E )h  p b1 , where E  (0,1) is a discount factor. We assume that the surplus
derived by consuming the product for one period is h , hence for two periods it is (1  E )h . (2) For
consumer who first waits and then buys the legal product : b 2 , his surplus would be

V( 0 , b )

E (h  pb 2 ) . (3) For consumer who buys the pirated copy, his surplus would be

E (dh  f ) ,where d  (0,1) measures the degree of substitutability between the pirated copies
and the original since they might contain inconsistent/corrupt files or unresolved bugs. f is the
V( 0 , c )

expected value of fine, which is the probability for a pirated copy user to be caught multiplied by the
government fine. We assume risk-neutral consumers. (4) For consumer who does nothing in both the
periods, his surplus would be zero.
Consumers are then self-selected into different groups according to their reservation price for the
product. Consumers are assumed to have unit demand. Denote the quantity for each group with Q .
We can derive Q(b , 0 ) by finding the marginal consumer who is indifferent between choosing (b, 0) and
(0,b). Let h1 be the reservation price for this marginal consumer. Since V( b , 0 )  V( 0,b ) is increasing in

h ( 1  E t E t Ed ), all consumers with h ! h1 would choose (b, 0) over (0,b). Therefore,
Q(b ,0 ) would be 1  h1 . Similarly we can derive other demand functions for (0,b), (0,c).
By solving V( b , 0)
and h3

V( 0 ,b ) , V( 0 ,b )

V( 0 , c ) , V( 0 , c )

0 for h , we can get h1

pb1  Epb 2 , h2

pb 2  f
1 d

f
. We have the following constraints 1 t h1 t h2 t h3 t 0 . The demand function is
d
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Q( b , 0 )

1  h1 , Q( 0,b )

h1  h2 , and Q( 0,c )

h2  h3 .

The monopolist software

vendor will maximize the profit by setting discriminating prices for both of the periods,
i.e., MaxS pb1Q(b , 0 )  Ep b 2 Q( 0,b ) subject to 1 t h1 t h2 t h3 t 0 .
( pb 1 , pb 2 )

By

pb*1
Q(*b , 0)

finding

the

first

order

condition

with

respect

to

pb1 , p b 2

,

we

get

1  E (1  f  d ) * 1  d  f
, pb 2
, and the optimal demand for each segment are
2
2
1 *
f
1 f (2  d )
1 E (1  d  f ) 2
, Q( 0,b )
, Q(*0,c )


. And S *
.
2
2(1  d )
2 2d (1  d )
4
4(1  d )

It is showed that when f

0 there is Q(*0,b )

0 , so that it is always optimal to sell only in the first

period. Here, we have proposition 1.

Proposition 1: Government’s penalty enables the producer to version his product for increased
profitability.
Versioning leads to two results: on one hand, its lower price helps to expand the market by attracting
some people from buying pirated copy to buying legal product; on the other hand, it cannibalizes sales
of the superior product in the first period. It is showed that, when f 0 , the loss from cannibalization
cannot be covered by the benefits gained from the expanded market, therefore product versioning is
not optimal. When f ! 0 , the monopolist can differentiate the products more effectively. Particularly,
we have

wQ(*0,b )
wf

! 0 and

d (1  d )
wS *
! 0 . When f !
, Q(*0,c )
2d
wf

0 . Pirated copies will be

completely driven out of the market.

3.2 WITH RENTAL OPTION
We assume that rental exists only in the first period (see Choudhary et al. 1998, Bulow et al. 1982).
Rental is generally short-term in nature, and thus not considered in the second period. For consumers,
they can either buy or rent or do nothing in the first period. Some people choose renting over buying
since it is more affordable ( pb1 ! p r ) or they may just need the software for short-term usage. If he
rents or does nothing, he might consider buying a legal software or a pirated copy in the second period.
The surplus obtained from the rental product is V( r , 0 ) kh  p r , where k  (0,1) captures utility
difference between the purchased copy and the rental copy. The rental mechanism might cause some
inconvenience for users. Space for consumer’s choices would be {(b, 0) (r, b) (r, c) (0, b) (r, 0) (0, c)
(0, 0)}. The versions of products for these seven groups are sorted from the highest to the lowest given
the condition that k  Ed ! E ! k ! Ed ! 0 , which implies that consumers get more benefits by
buying than by renting, and the rental products provide more benefits than the pirated copies. Though
there are seven possible groups, they actually cannot exist simultaneously (Please see the proof in
Appendix.A). We identified three cases:
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Case 1: 0  f d

d (k  Ed )
2k  Ed

Market is segmented to four groups: (1) Buy at the beginning V( b , 0 )
buy V( r ,b )

V( 0 , c )

(1  E )h  p b1 ; (2) Rent then

kh  p r  E (h  pb 2 ) ; (3) Rent and nothing V( r ,0 )

kh  p r ; (4) Copy

E (dh  f ) .

1  E (1  f  d )
k  E ( f  d) *
1
, p r*
, pb 2
; quantity are
2
2
2
Ef
Ef
f
1 *
1
Q(*b ,0 )
, Q( r ,b ) 0, Q(*r ,0 )
, Q(*0,c )


;
and
profit
is
2
2(k  Ed )
2 2(k  Ed ) d
1 E (1  f  d ) Ef (k  Ed  Ef )
S*


. It is optimal for the monopolist to sell and rent only in
4
4
4(k  Ed )
the first period and not to sell in the second period ( Q(*r ,b ) 0 ). Particularly, the

Optimal solution for prices are pb*1

constraints 1 t h4 t h5 t h6 t h7 t 0 should not be violated. By submitting ( pb*1 , p r* , pb*2 ) , we have
the condition 0  f d

Case 2:

d (k  Ed )
.
2k  Ed

d (k  Ed )
d (1  d )
 f d
2k  Ed
2d

The optimal solution is pb*1

Q(*b ,0)
is S

*

1
2

,

Q(*r ,b )

0

1  E (1  f  d ) * k * 1  d  f
, pr
, pb 2
, the optimal quantity is
2
2
2
f
1 f (2  d )

, Q(*0,b )
, Q(*0,c )
, and profit
2(1  d )
2 2d (1  d )

1 E (1  d  f ) 2

. Since Q(*r ,b )
4
4(1  d )

Case 3: f

0 , no renting option is best for the monopolist.

0
1  E (1  f  d ) * k * 1  d  f
, pr
, pb 2
, the optimal quantity is
2
2
2
1
1  E (1  f  d )
0, Q(*0,c )
and profit is S *
. Again, when the
2
4

The optimal solution is pb*1

Q(*b ,0 )

1 *
, Q( r ,b )
2

Q(*r ,c )

government exacts no penalty, the optimal strategy for the monopolist is to provide only first period
sales and without renting option.
3.3. COMPARISON
First, we investigate the impact of offering renting from the standpoint of the software vendor. We
compare the profit S of the monopolist with or without renting option. For case 1,
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S *rent  S *norent

Ef 2 ( E  k )
! 0 . And, in cases 2 and 3, profit does not change since it is
4(k  Ed )(1  d )

optimal not to offer rental products.

Proposition 2: The software vendor can increase the profit by offering the rental option only if the
government penalty satisfies 0  f d

d (k  Ed )
.
2k  Ed

d ( k  Ed )
, the penalty is high enough to drive out copying; therefore no renting is needed.
2 k  Ed
When f 0 , no renting will change the market share of pirated copies. When f is in the
intermediate range, by introducing a lower version ( k d E d 1 ) product -- the rental product, the
When f t

monopolist expands its market size substantially, attracting not only the consumers who originally buy
at the second period but also some consumers who would buy the pirated copy. Revenues from renting
exceed
the
losses
from
selling
in
the
second
period: p

* rent
r

Q

* rent
( r ,0)

 Ep

*norent
b2

Q

Proposition 3: When 0  f d

*norent
( 0 ,b )

Ef 2 ( E  k )
>0.
4(k  Ed )(1  d )

d (k  Ed )
, renting helps more when the penalty is higher and the
2k  Ed

pirated copies approximating closer to the original, that is,

w (S *rent  S *norent )
! 0 and
wd

w (S *rent  S *norent )
!0.
wf
The intuition behind is that, when quality of pirated copies is good, the vendor has more incentives to
offer the renting option to compete against them. Since the higher penalty allows the vendor to price
discriminate more effectively, the advantage brought by renting becomes obvious.

d (1  d )
, the higher the substitutability of pirated copies or rental
2d
wS *rent
wS *rent
 0,
 0 ); and the higher the penalty
products, the lower the profit of monopolist (
wd
wk
wS *rent
! 0 ).
by government, the higher the profit of monopolist (
wf

Proposition 4: When 0 d f d

The first two terms are obvious. When the substitutability of the pirated copies is higher, there is more
competition from the copying market, which reduces the sales of legitimate product more. As the
government penalty increases the cost of pirated copies, making them less attractive, the provider’s
loss due to piracy is greatly reduced. The last term means that the version of rental products should not
be too high since it will cannibalize the sales in the first period. Suppose the condition k ! Ed holds,
the optimal version of rental products should be close to the version of the pirated copies.
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Next, we investigate the impact of renting on social welfare. Following the utilitarian approach by
Waldman (1991), social welfare is the sum of the surplus of consumers, the profit of vendor, and the
fine collected by government. We denote the welfare without renting and case 1 with renting with
W *norent ,W *rent , respectively. Then there is:

W

*norent

3  E (3  d  2 f ) Ef 2 (4  3d )

W *rent
8
8d (1  d )

3  E (3  d  2 f ) Ef 2 (4k  3Ed )

8
8d (k  Ed )

Proposition 5: Introduction of renting will result in the loss of social welfare. That is,

W

*rent

W

*norent

Ef 2 ( E  k )

 0.
8(1  d )(k  Ed )

This is due to the underutilization of the lower version of the rental product. When the rental option is
introduced, buying consumers in period two would switch to renting. Since this rental product has a
lower version, the consumer surplus is reduced.

Proposition 6: The higher the substitutability of pirated copies or rental products, the higher the
social welfare. (

wW *rent
wd

! 0,

wW *rent
wk

! 0)

Since the higher version of products provides higher utility for consumers, both increasing the version
of pirated copies and the rental products would benefit the consumers. Therefore, for societal sake,
software vendors should be encouraged to produce a higher version of the product, say, by improving
the service in renting. However, we know from the previous result (proposition 4) that the vendor is
worse off in this way.

Proposition 7: To maximize social welfare, the optimal penalty by government is f *

0.

From proposition 5, we know that renting always results in a social loss. Therefore, renting should not
be offered for the benefit of society. Since the penalty just prevents people from using the pirated copy,
it is optimal not to set any penalty. For the case with renting option, we found that the second optimal
solution f *

(k  Ed )d
. It shows that the penalty should neither be too high nor too low.
4 k  3 Ed

Government can strike a balance between public benefit and the financial incentives of vendor.

4.

MODEL WITH NETWORK EFFECT

Further, we examine the case when network effect is presented. When there is network effect, the
greater the number of users, and the higher the value of software product. If a consumer buys : b1 and
uses it over two periods, his surplus would be V( b , 0 )

(1  E )h  pb1  eQI  Ee(QI  QII ) , where e

is the intensity of network effect and Q I , Q II are the numbers of copies used in the first period and in
the second period, separately. Here, we assume that the first period purchaser can get upgrades, thus
enjoying the network benefit in the second period ( Ee(Q I  Q II ) ). Note that in the no renting case

QI is the number of purchasers in the first period while in the renting case it is the number of
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purchasers plus the number of renters. If consumer rents : r , his surplus would be

V( r , 0 )

kh  p r  eQI . If consumer buys : b 2 in the second period, his surplus would be

V( 0 ,b )

E (h  pb 2 )  Ee(QI  QII ) . If consumer buys the pirated copy : c , his surplus would be

V( 0 , c )

E (dh  f )  Ee(QI  QII ) .

4.1. COMPARISON
We compare the models with renting or without renting through simulation analyses. We would focus
on the impact of the network effect on optimal pricing, quantity and profit by arbitrarily setting and
changing the values of parameters in the model. We show the simulation results when
E 0.9 , d 0.8 , k 0.8 , f 0.05 in Appendix B. Other parameter values bring only quantitative
differences. From our simulation results, we can conclude the following propositions.

Proposition 8: The profit and social welfare are increasing with the intensity of network effect in
both of the case with renting and without renting.
The network effect raises the utility of the consumers and hence the willingness to pay. Therefore,
both the software vendor and the consumers are better off.

Proposition 9: In the presence of network effect, the software vendor’s profit is higher when
offering renting option.
Introduction of renting in the first period magnifies the network effect thus allow the product to be
sold at a higher price ( pb*1rent t p b*1norent , pb*2rent t pb*norent
). The software vendor can effectively
2
differentiate the market by selling to the high-type consumers in the first period and leasing then
selling to the residual consumers. More people would transfer from buying pirated copy to buying or
renting the legal product in the first period to enjoy the benefit from network effect ( eQI ). When e is
high enough, the copying market is totally driven out.

Proposition 10: With renting option, social welfare is only higher when the network effect is in the
middle range.
Renting has two-sided effects on social welfare. On one hand, it raises the social welfare since renting
is more affordable thus allowing more people to use it. On the other hand, the lower version reduces
the social welfare due to underutilization. Our simulation results show that, when the network effect is
at the middle level, the benefit from renting by expanding the market size can outweigh the loss from
providing the lower version. However, when the network effect is low, or high enough until the whole
market is covered, it would be best for the society not to use the renting option.

5. FUTURE RESEARCH EXTENSIONS
The main focus of this paper is to show that renting is a viable strategy in countering the threat of
piracy. Vendor’s profit increased with the use of a renting option. We show that, with the introduction
of renting, some consumers switch from copying to renting, and the software vendor is better off
renting. However, introduction of renting leads to the loss of social welfare. We show the necessary
optimal government policy to strike a balance between the vendor and the society. We also extended
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the model to the case when network effect is present. In this paper, we assume that a monopolist both
sells and rents the product. Sometimes, the software manufacturer has to rely on intermediaries to
distribute the product, i.e. a seller and a renter. Further research to investigate the optimal strategies
under different market structures should be pursued. Additionally, we only consider the monopolist in
the model. The model can be extended to a duopoly or oligopoly situation in future efforts.

APPENDIX A
Proof of market segmentation
Proof for case 1: when (r, 0) exists, (0,b) will be dominated, and only one of the two groups (r, c), (0,c) can exist.
(1) If (r, 0) exist, there should be such h0 that V( r , 0 ) ( h0 ) ! 0 and V( r , 0 ) ( h0 ) ! V( 0,b ) ( h0 ) , which derive

p r Ep b 2  p r
p
p
d
 p r d pb 2 k . Then, for any h  r  pb 2 , there is V( 0,b )  0 , and for h t r , there
k
E k
k
k
is V( r ,b ) ! V( 0,b ) , so that (0, b) cannot be chosen. (2) If both (r, c) and (0,c) exist, for people to choose copying,
there

should

be

such

h0

V( 0.c ) (h0 ) ! 0 ,

that

V( 0,c ) (h0 ) ! V( r , 0) (h0 ) ,

which

derive

p  Ef
p
p
p
f
f
f
d r
 d r . However, for any h  r , there is V( 0,r )  0 , and for h t r t , there is
d
k  Ed
d
k
k
k
d
V( r ,c ) ! V( r ,0 ) , so that (r, 0) would not be chosen, which contradict with the assumption <Q.E.D>. Similarly,
we can prove the market segmentation for cases 2 and 3.

APPENDIX B - Simulation results ( E
Figure 1 Prof it
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no rent
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